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It has been proposed that social anxiety disorder (SAD) is associated with automatic infor-
mation processing biases resulting in hypersensitivity to signals of social threat such as
negative facial expressions. However, the nature and extent of automatic processes in SAD
on the behavioral and neural level is not entirely clear yet. The present review summarizes
neuroscientific findings on automatic processing of facial threat but also other disorder-
related stimuli such as emotional prosody or negative words in SAD. We review initial
evidence for automatic activation of the amygdala, insula, and sensory cortices as well as
for automatic early electrophysiological components. However, findings vary depending
on tasks, stimuli, and neuroscientific methods. Only few studies set out to examine auto-
matic neural processes directly and systematic attempts are as yet lacking. We suggest
that future studies should: (1) use different stimulus modalities, (2) examine different emo-
tional expressions, (3) compare findings in SAD with other anxiety disorders, (4) use more
sophisticated experimental designs to investigate features of automaticity systematically,
and (5) combine different neuroscientific methods (such as functional neuroimaging and
electrophysiology). Finally, the understanding of neural automatic processes could also
provide hints for therapeutic approaches.
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INTRODUCTION
Social phobia, referred to as social anxiety disorder (SAD) in
the following, is one of the most frequent psychiatric disorders
with a lifetime prevalence of up to 12.1% (Kessler et al., 2005).
It is characterized by a “persistent fear of one or more social or
performance situations in which the person is exposed to unfa-
miliar people or to possible scrutiny by others,” accompanied
by the fear of embarrassment as the main feature. This leads to
avoidance of, or intense anxiety or distress in these situations
(Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, DSM-
IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994). According to several
models and experimental findings, the etiology and maintenance
of SAD might be due to automatic cognitive biases in the pro-
cessing of social information (Beck et al., 1985; Clark and Wells,
1995; Bögels and Mansell, 2004; Morrison and Heimberg, 2013),
such as increased automatic processing of angry faces (Gilboa-
Schechtman et al., 1999; Mogg et al., 2004). Biased information
processing toward clear or ambiguous signals of negative eval-
uation by others has been repeatedly shown across studies of
attention, memory, and interpretation (Heinrichs and Hofmann,
2001; Bögels and Mansell, 2004; Morrison and Heimberg, 2013).
Experimental results seem to be best explained by initial hypersen-
sitivity to, followed by subsequent avoidance of the threat stimulus,
as proposed in several cognitive hypervigilance-avoidance mod-
els (Williams et al., 1988; Amir et al., 1998; Mogg and Bradley,
1998; Bögels and Mansell, 2004; Vassilopoulos, 2005) and models
proposing abnormal self-focused attention in social anxiety (Clark
and Wells, 1995; Bögels and Mansell, 2004). However, results across
studies in SAD are not that consistent, which may depend on
the selection of experimental tasks (e.g., emotional stroop, dot-
probe, visual search, cognitive load tasks), dependent variables
(e.g., reaction times, eye movements, explicit stimuli ratings, auto-
nomic responses, brain responses), processing steps (e.g., early
vs. late responses), and stimuli (e.g., different facial expressions,
disorder-related words, emotional prosody) (Straube, 2009), as
will be described in the following paragraphs.
AUTOMATIC PROCESSES: OPERATIONALIZATION AND BEHAVIORAL
FINDINGS IN SAD
Threat processing, not only in SAD but in anxiety disorders in
general, is thought to occur involuntarily, non-strategically, and
fast, and therefore automatically (Teachman et al., 2012). Auto-
maticity of a process can be defined by several features which
may differ independently and may be expressed to various extents
in different tasks (Bargh, 1994; Moors and De Houwer, 2006).
Bargh (1994) postulates the “four horsemen of automaticity” –
awareness, efficiency, intention, and control – as optional and
independent features of a process. Awareness or consciousness
deals with the phenomenal aspect (i.e., subjective experience) of
a process. Efficiency is often defined as an inverse function of the
amount of processing resources required to master a task. Inten-
tion refers to the controlled initiation of a process, and control
describes the ability to avoid, stop, or alter a process once it has
been started. However, Moors and De Houwer (2006) argue that
there is a strong overlap of intention and control and thus refer
to these processes as goal-related features (among others such
as goal-dependent, autonomous, and purely stimulus-driven).
Taken together, the automatic nature of a process is given when
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participants do not have particular goals, do not invest a substan-
tial amount of cognitive resources, or do not have awareness in
relation to the instigating stimulus, of the process itself, or of its
outcome.
Paradigms to investigate unconscious processing of (emo-
tional) stimuli are, for example, backward-masking, binocular
rivalry, continuous flash suppression, or the attentional blink par-
adigm (e.g., Kim and Blake, 2005; Palermo and Rhodes, 2007). The
efficiency of the processing of task-irrelevant (emotional) stimuli
can be investigated by the attentional load imposed by a distract-
ing main task (Lavie, 1995; Pessoa, 2005). Spatial and feature-based
attentional tasks are typical designs to assess goal-related features
of automaticity. For example, when the emotionality of an angry
face is processed (measured by behavioral performance, auto-
nomic, or brain responses) in a gender discrimination task, this
processing occurs at least partially automatically (i.e., uncontrolled
and unintentional) as emotion was not task-relevant.
So-called attentional biases, which indicate automatic process-
ing of threat stimuli, can be investigated by paradigms such as
dot-probe, modified stroop tasks, or visual search tasks (Bar-Haim
et al., 2007; Teachman et al., 2012). Individuals with SAD, but
also participants with high scores in trait social anxiety, show
biased performance in response to social threat during those
tasks (Lundh and Öst, 1996; Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 1999;
Mogg and Bradley, 2002; Mogg et al., 2004; Pishyar et al., 2004;
Rinck and Becker, 2005) and changed patterns of eye move-
ments when confronted with facial expressions (Mansell et al.,
1999; Horley et al., 2004; Garner et al., 2006), even though results
vary between studies. For example, findings from dot-probe tasks
can be seen as markers of unintentional and uncontrolled pro-
cessing of threat. In those tasks, participants have to indicate
the location of a dot that follows a pair of emotional-neutral-
stimuli (e.g., two faces or words, one emotional, and the other
one neutral). When responses to the dot are faster at the loca-
tion indicated by the emotional compared to the neutral stimulus,
this is taken as a measure of attentional bias. Dot-probe results
in SAD are rather inconsistent (Teachman et al., 2012). Inter-
estingly, timing seems to play a crucial role. A vigilance bias
for angry compared to happy and neutral faces was found for
example only at a presentation duration of 500 ms, but not at
1,250 ms (Mogg et al., 2004). The authors suggest that, with the
longer presentation duration, initial orienting might have become
overshadowed by avoidance tendencies. Further differences might
depend on the use of faces vs. words. Pishyar et al. (2004), for
example, found an attentional bias for negative faces but not for
negative words in SAD. Findings of Amir et al. (2003) suggest
that SAD might be associated with a problem to disengage from
threat words. Vassilopoulos (2005) reported that processing of
threat words in SAD, as assessed with the dot-probe task, follows
a hypervigilant-avoidance pattern. Moreover, Musa et al. (2003)
reported an attentional bias to words with the dot-probe task
in SAD, when controlling for comorbid depression, suggesting
the need for careful further research. Whether attentional biases
can occur efficiently, i.e., regardless of cognitive resources (as sug-
gested, for example, in Teachman et al., 2012), has not been tested,
as processing resources have not been manipulated. Furthermore,
results from subliminal paradigms do not consistently argue for
unconscious attentional biases (Mogg et al., 2004; Van Peer et al.,
2010).
NEURAL CORRELATES OF AUTOMATIC THREAT-PROCESSING IN SAD
As described above, behavioral data do not always support the
hypothesis of differential automatic processing of threat-related
stimuli in SAD compared to healthy controls. This might be due
to the fact that behavioral responses as a measure are only par-
tially able to reveal the underlying complex information process-
ing cascade. Increased vigilance, altered perception, (automatic)
avoidance tendencies, response selection and execution processes,
or coping behavior are often intermingled (Cloitre et al., 1992;
Amir et al., 1998; Straube and Miltner, 2006; Straube, 2009). Neu-
roscientific research might more directly provide information on
automatic threat processing in SAD. Along these lines, the investi-
gation of neural activation during exposure to (disorder-related)
threat stimuli might not only reveal the neural basis of (reliable)
cognitive biases in SAD, but yields the opportunity to investigate
hypersensitivity to specific stimuli in SAD even in the absence
of distorted overt behavior. From the latter perspective, measures
of brain activation can be regarded as an additional method to
complement conventional paradigms in experimental psychol-
ogy, ultimately aiming to answer the question whether and, if so,
under what conditions patients suffering from SAD show abnor-
mal automatic processing of social information. The current state
of knowledge concerning automatic brain activation to threat in
SAD will be described in Section “Automatic Brain Responses to
Threat-Related Stimuli in SAD” of this review.
SCOPE OF THE REVIEW
This review aims to describe and discuss neuroscientific findings
on automatic processing of threat-related stimuli in SAD either
as a correlate of altered behavioral performance or in the absence
of abnormal performance data. Most research on disorder-related
stimuli processing in SAD focused on faces (Machado-de-Sousa
et al., 2010; Staugaard, 2010). Facial information such as expres-
sion or gaze may have a special relevance in SAD (Schneier et al.,
2011): they provide direct, online feedback in social interactions
and are of high evolutionary relevance (Öhman and Mineka,
2001). Although the focus of the review is on face processing,
we will also discuss research that used other disorder-related stim-
uli (emotional prosody from voices, verbal stimuli), as these are
as important as facial stimuli in social interactions and subject to
altered processing in SAD (Quadflieg et al., 2007; Schmidt et al.,
2010). It should be noted that recent reviews on SAD focused
on a broad range of tasks and methods, but did not specifically
address neural mechanisms of automaticity of threat processing
(Freitas-Ferrari et al., 2010).
In this review, we will consider both functional imaging studies
(fMRI) as well as electrophysiological studies (EEG). While fMRI
yields findings with high spatial resolution, the temporal resolu-
tion is too slow to give insights into the rapid neural dynamics. In
contrast, electrophysiological measures offer very high temporal
resolution, but with high spatial uncertainty (Debener et al., 2006).
Although a“social anxiety spectrum”with non-clinical and clinical
manifestations has been proposed (Schneier et al., 2002; Miskovic
and Schmidt, 2012), we focus on participants that meet the clinical
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criteria for SAD, but also include studies with subclinical samples
if these are beneficial for the scope of this review. While Section
“Automatic Brain Responses to Threat-Related Stimuli in SAD”
reviews findings in detail (including Table 1), Section “General
Discussion and Future Directions” offers an integrative discussion
concerning the role of experimental tasks, stimulus modalities,
emotional expressions, neuroscientific methods, and SAD speci-
ficity of the findings. We hope that especially this section stimulates
future research on the neurobiology of SAD and automatic threat
processing in SAD in particular.
AUTOMATIC BRAIN RESPONSES TO THREAT-RELATED
STIMULI IN SAD
Recent meta-analyses and reviews based on functional imaging
studies propose a network of regions as the neural underpinnings
of different anxiety disorders, including SAD (Etkin and Wager,
2007; Shin and Liberzon, 2010). Different regions seem to have
different functions in the various components of fear process-
ing such as the perception of threat, the subjective awareness of
fear and anxiety, or the learning, execution, and modulation of
fear responses (Straube and Miltner, 2006; Straube et al., 2006;
Quadflieg et al., 2008; Shin and Liberzon, 2010; Lipka et al., 2011).
Furthermore, activation in different areas seems to follow different
time courses and is differentially susceptible to task manipulations
modulating efficiency, goal-relatedness, or consciousness (Straube
et al., 2011a). In general, both symptom provocation studies in
SAD such as public speech (Tillfors et al., 2001) or anticipation
of public speech (Lorberbaum et al., 2004) and studies on pro-
cessing disorder-related stimuli (see below) seem to activate the
amygdala. Other regions that have been shown to be activated
in SAD comprise the insula (Straube et al., 2004), an area that
is involved in the representation of bodily states and anxiety in
general (Critchley et al., 2004; Paulus and Stein, 2006; Straube
et al., 2006; Etkin and Wager, 2007), and areas in prefrontal cor-
tex (PFC) including orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) (Quadflieg et al.,
2008; Goldin et al., 2009) and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC)
(Blair et al., 2012).
It has been proposed that anxiety disorders are characterized
by initial hyperactivity of the amygdala to threatening stimuli
(LeDoux, 2000; Öhman and Mineka, 2001), with subsequent acti-
vation of other regions (Straube and Miltner, 2006; Hofmann
et al., 2012). The amygdala has been proposed to mediate auto-
matic, bottom-up processing of emotional, and particularly of
threatening stimuli (Öhman, 2005). With its interconnections to
various cortical regions as well as the brain stem and hypothala-
mus, the amygdala plays a central role in an alerting response, in
the regulation of the autonomic nervous system, but also in the
modulation of perceptual and emotional processing of relevant
stimuli (LeDoux, 2000; Pessoa and Adolphs, 2010; Tamietto and
De Gelder, 2010; Lipka et al., 2011). Furthermore, activation of
the amygdala modulates selective perceptual processing via back-
projections to sensory cortices (Vuilleumier et al., 2002; Amaral
et al., 2003; Freese and Amaral, 2005). In healthy participants,
several studies have demonstrated higher amygdala activation to
threat even under attentional distraction (Vuilleumier et al., 2001;
Anderson et al., 2003), despite restricted resources (Cornwell et al.,
2011; Mothes-Lasch et al., 2013), in backward masking at least for
the right amygdala (Morris et al., 1998, 1999; Whalen et al., 1998,
2004; Williams et al., 2006), and under suppression in binocular
rivalry (Williams et al., 2004b). Nevertheless, other studies showed
no differential activation for negative vs. neutral faces under high
perceptual load induced by a main task (Pessoa et al., 2002, 2005b;
Bishop et al., 2007; Silvert et al., 2007) or during unconscious pro-
cessing (Pessoa et al., 2006). These findings emphasize the need to
carefully control experimental conditions with respect to differ-
ent features of automaticity such as difficulty of tasks, saliency of
stimuli, quality of the masking procedure (Straube et al., 2010), or
expectations of the participants.
Several electrophysiological studies, which allow stronger con-
clusions on temporal aspects of threat processing, have been con-
ducted in SAD; however, findings are only partially consistent as
described below. In general, ERP components measured with EEG
are assumed to reflect different stages of processing. These seem
to comprise an early, automatic stage associated with enhanced
early ERPs to threat-related compared to neutral stimuli [such as
P1, P2, N2, or early posterior negativity (EPN)], and a later, more
controlled and conscious stage of processing that is associated
with enhanced responses of late positive components (starting
around 300 ms) (Eimer et al., 2003; Holmes et al., 2003; Liddell
et al., 2004; Kolassa et al., 2005; Kiss and Eimer, 2008; Straube
et al., 2011b; Michalowski et al., 2012). While early potentials are
associated with automatic perceptual analysis and vigilance, late
potentials such as P3 and LPC reflect the controlled evaluation of
stimuli, motivated attentional processes, and response preparation
(Schupp et al., 2000; Straube et al., 2011c).
PROCESSING OF EMOTIONAL FACES
Neurobiological models of face processing (Haxby et al., 2000)
suggest that after initial perception of facial features in the infe-
rior occipital gyrus, relatively invariant features (such as identity)
of a face are processed in the lateral fusiform gyrus (FG), while
changeable aspects of the face activate areas in the superior tempo-
ral sulcus (STS), implying a critical role of this region for encoding
facial expressions. Crucially, both STS and FG are interconnected
with limbic and para-limbic areas, such as the insula, the amygdala,
and the OFC. Facial expressions have been shown to modulate the
activation of the amygdala (Breiter et al., 1996; Winston et al.,
2003b; Fitzgerald et al., 2006) as well as of the extrastriate visual
cortex in healthy participants, and this occurs in an automatic
fashion (Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Winston et al., 2003a). However,
the extent of enhanced automatic processing of aversive faces is a
matter of debate (Pessoa, 2005; Straube et al., 2011b).
With regard to automatic neural processing in SAD, we will
focus on activations of these regions under different tasks, rang-
ing from explicit emotion processing (e.g., emotion classification,
valence judgment, emotion matching) to implicit tasks (e.g., gen-
der classification as well as picture type classification; see Table 1).
Similar to emotion classification or emotion judgment, the emo-
tion matching task (Hariri et al., 2002) is a strictly explicit task
due to the importance of the facial expression for solving this task.
Explicit tasks can show differences in brain responses under con-
scious and intended processing, and can be opposed to results
from implicit, potentially automatic processing. Implicit tasks
comprise feature-based or spatial attention paradigms in which
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Table 1 | Studies investigating automatic processing by means of facial expressions, voices, and words.
Study Group Task Main results (anxious vs. controls)
FACES
Studies investigating only differences
fMRI
Explicit
Phan et al. (2006) SAD vs. HC Emotion classification Higher activation of amygdala (angry, fearful, disgusted and sad vs. happy and
neutral)
Yoon et al. (2007) SAD vs. HC Emotion classification Higher activation of amygdala, insula (high vs. low arousing angry, fearful,
disgusted, sad, happy)
Birbaumer et al.
(1998)
SAD vs. HC Valence, arousal, and
intensity judgment
Higher activation of amygdala (neutral faces)
Amir et al. (2005) SAD vs. HC Valence judgment Higher activation of ACC, insula, IFG, PG (disgust vs. neutral)
Cooney et al. (2006) SAD vs. HC Valence judgment Higher activation of right amygdala, lower activation of left amygdala (neutral
faces vs. visual baseline)
Klumpp et al. (2010) SAD vs. HC Valence judgment Higher activation of amygdala, insula, OFC, Midbrain, PG (angry, fearful,
disgusted)
Labuschagne et al.
(2012)
SAD vs. HC Valence judgment Higher activation of MPFC, ACC (sad vs. neutral)
Pujol et al. (2009) HSA vs. LSA Emotion matching Higher social anxiety scores associated with higher activation of amygdala
(fearful and happy faces vs. shapes)
Labuschagne et al.
(2010)
SAD vs. HC Emotion matching Higher activation of amygdala (fearful faces vs. shapes, but not angry or happy
faces vs. shapes)
Ball et al. (2012) HSA vs. LSA Emotion matching Higher social anxiety scores associated with higher activation of amygdala,
insula, ACC (angry and fearful vs. happy)
Sladky et al. (2012) SAD vs. HC Emotion matching Higher habituation of the amygdala, OFC, and Thalamus (anger, disgust, fear,
happiness, sadness, surprise, and calm faces vs. shapes)
Klumpp et al. (2012) SAD vs. HC Emotion matching Higher activation of amygdala, insula, IFG (fearful and angry vs. happy)
Free viewing
Straube et al. (2005) SAD vs. HC Free viewing Higher activation of FG (angry, happy, and neutral faces vs. visual symbol),
amygdala (happy and angry vs. visual symbol), insula (angry vs. visual baseline)
Evans et al. (2008) SAD vs. HC Free viewing Higher activation of amygdala, DLPFC; lower activation of ACC (angry vs.
neutral schematic faces)
Goldin et al. (2009) SAD vs. HC Free viewing Higher activation of OFC, ACC, PG (angry faces vs. neutral scenes)
Implicit
Stein et al. (2002) SAD vs. HC Gender classification Higher activation of amygdala, IFG, and MPFC (angry and contemptuous vs.
happy, but not fearful and neutral vs. happy)
Campbell et al.
(2007)
SAD vs. HC Gender classification Higher activation of amygdala and insula, activation later in SAD than in HC
(angry, fearful, and happy)
Blair et al. (2008b) SAD vs. HC Gender classification Higher activation of amygdala, MFG, DLPFC, ACC, STS (fearful vs. neutral but
not anger vs. neutral)
Blair et al. (2011) SAD vs. HC Gender classification Higher activation of amygdala, ACC (angry and fearful vs. neutral)
Gentili et al. (2008) SAD vs. HC n-Back identity Higher activation of amygdala, insula, STS; lower activation of FG, DLPFC
(angry, fearful, disgust, happy, and neutral vs. visual baseline)
EEG
Explicit
Kolassa et al. (2009) SAD vs. HC Emotion classification Enhanced P1 (angry, sad, happy, and neutral schematic faces)
Van Peer et al. (2009) SAD vs. HC Emotion classification No differences
Moser et al. (2008) HSA vs. LSA Emotion classification Enhanced P3/LPP (anger and disgust vs. happy and surprised)
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Study Group Task Main results (anxious vs. controls)
Sewell et al. (2008) HSA vs. LSA Emotional oddball P3 amplitude associated with level of social anxiety
(deviant angry faces, but not happy faces)
Rossignol et al.
(2012a)
HSA vs. LSA Emotional oddball Enhanced P1 (deviant angry, fearful, disgusted, and happy
vs. neutral)
Free viewing
Mühlberger et al.
(2009)
HSA vs. LSA Free viewing Enhanced EPN (angry and fearful vs. happy and neutral)
McTeague et al.
(2011)
HSA vs. LSA Free viewing Sustained ssVEP enhancement (angry, fearful, happy vs.
neutral)
Implicit
Helfinstein et al.
(2008)
HSA vs. LSA Emotional primed dot probe Enhanced P1, P2 (angry and neutral faces)
Mueller et al. (2009) SAD vs. HC Dot-probe Enhanced P1 (angry faces)
Rossignol et al.
(2012b)
HSA vs. LSA Visual probe task Enhanced P1, P2 (angry, fearful, disgust, happy, and
neutral faces)
Wieser et al. (2011) HSA vs. LSA Change detection Sustained ssVEP enhancement (angry vs. neutral and
happy)
Wieser et al. (2012) HSA vs. LSA Change detection ssVEP Face bias to angry faces
Studies investigating group× task differences
fMRI
Straube et al. (2004) SAD vs. HC Explicit: emotion classification Higher activation of insula (angry vs. neutral)
Implicit: picture type classification Higher activation of amygdala, FG, STS, insula, PG (angry
vs. neutral)
EEG
Kolassa et al. (2007) SAD vs. HC Explicit: emotion classification Enhanced P1 (angry, happy, and neutral schematic faces)
Implicit: color classification Enhanced P1 (angry, happy, and neutral schematic faces)
Kolassa and Miltner
(2006)
SAD vs. HC Explicit: emotion classification Enhanced N170 (angry faces)
Implicit: gender classification No differences
VOICES
Studies investigating group× task differences
fMRI
Quadflieg et al.
(2008)
SAD vs. HC Explicit: emotion classification Higher activation of the OFC (anger vs. neutral)
Implicit: gender classification Higher activation of the OFC (anger vs. neutral)
WORDS
Studies investigating group× task differences
fMRI
Schmidt et al. (2010) SAD vs. HC Explicit: relevance for social interaction No differences
Implicit: grammatical type Higher activation of left amygdala and right OFC
IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; PG, parahippocampal gyrus; FG, fusiform gyrus; STS, superior temporal sulcus; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; OFC, orbitofrontal cortex;
MPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; SAD, social anxiety disorder; HC, healthy control; EPN, early posterior negativity; LPP, late
positive potential; ssVEP, steady state visually evoked potential.
the emotional content is not task-relevant. Thus, they can pro-
vide more direct hints of automatic processes as the task does
not demand the processing of the emotional content, so that they
could elucidate dimensions of automaticity such as efficiency (in
the presence of a primary task) or the absence of intentional-
ity. A special class of tasks are free viewing paradigms with the
instruction just to “watch” the faces. These tasks are supposed to
foster“natural”stimulus processing, though one cannot determine
what participants actually attend to or do, which severely impedes
interpretation. Explicit tasks and free viewing paradigms are not
particularly helpful to determine automaticity, as they stimulate
conscious and intentional emotion processing and do not allow
conclusions on efficiency and control. For the sake of a review on
automaticity, studies using implicit paradigms are more suited to
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investigate features of automaticity, especially those few that com-
pare explicit and implicit emotion processing instead of only group
differences. The following summary will stick to this partitioning.
To our knowledge, there are no neuroscientific studies investigat-
ing awareness and efficiency of emotional face processing in SAD
explicitly.
fMRI studies
Explicit tasks. Studies assessing emotion classification show
higher activation of the amygdala even to neutral faces (Birbaumer
et al., 1998) or higher activation of the amygdala to negative
(i.e., angry, disgusted, and fearful) vs. happy faces (Phan et al.,
2006) in SAD vs. healthy controls. Yoon et al. (2007) conducted
a further analysis of the data by Phan et al. (2006) and found
higher activation of the amygdala and the insula to high vs. low
arousing emotional (i.e., angry, disgusted, fearful, sad, and happy)
faces. In line with these studies, studies assessing valence judgments
show higher activation of the amygdala to negative (angry, fearful,
and disgusted) faces (Klumpp et al., 2010), higher activation of
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and insula to disgusted faces
(Amir et al., 2005), and higher activation of the ACC and MPFC
to sad faces (Labuschagne et al., 2012). Furthermore, Cooney et al.
(2006) show a dissociation of the amygdala response to neutral
faces, with higher activation of the right, but lower activation of the
left amygdala to neutral faces for SAD vs. healthy controls. Studies
using the emotion matching task showed an association between
anxiety ratings and amygdala activation to emotional faces after
controlling for FG activation (Pujol et al., 2009), and a correlation
of anxiety scores with higher activation of the amygdala, insula,
and ACC to emotional faces (Ball et al., 2012). Studies showed
higher activation of the amygdala to fearful faces (Labuschagne
et al., 2010), and stronger activation of the insula to fearful than
happy faces (Klumpp et al., 2012). After initial hyperactivation,
strong habituation has been shown for anger, disgust, fear, happi-
ness, sadness, surprise, and calmness in the amygdala,orbitofrontal
cortex, and thalamus for SAD but not for healthy controls (Sladky
et al., 2012). These studies on explicit emotion processing con-
firm a neuronal sensitivity of the amygdala, but partially also of
the insula, ACC, and prefrontal areas, in SAD to faces in general,
especially to negative and arousing faces.
Free viewing paradigms. Studies revealed enhanced activation
in extrastriate visual areas to happy, angry, and neutral photo-
realistic faces, enhanced amygdala activation only to happy and
angry faces, and enhanced insula activation to angry faces in SAD
vs. healthy participants (Straube et al., 2005) as well as enhanced
activation of the amygdala to angry vs. neutral but not angry vs.
happy schematic faces (Evans et al., 2008). The latter study found
higher activation for happy vs. neutral faces only in the FG and
insula. These findings demonstrate some inconsistency in the pro-
cessing of facial expressions in the amygdala and insula under
non-restricted experimental conditions.
Implicit tasks. A paradigm that ensured attention allocation to
another facial information (gender instead of emotion) by incor-
porating gender classification revealed higher amygdala activation
to angry and contemptuous compared to happy facial expres-
sions in SAD (Stein et al., 2002), but not for fearful or neutral
vs. happy faces. This finding can be regarded as a first hint of
automatic,unintentional, and probably efficient processing of neg-
ative facial expressions in the amygdala in SAD. A further analysis
of the data of Stein and colleagues (Campbell et al., 2007) sug-
gested differential temporal dynamics in individuals with SAD
and healthy controls in the processing of fearful, happy, and angry
faces, with amygdala and insula activation occurring later in SAD,
in the absence of such a timing difference in FG. Delayed amyg-
dala activation to emotional faces in SAD seems counterintuitive.
The authors propose this to be a correlate of an atypical orienting
response, probably caused by a stronger self-focus and less efficient
attention allocation and scanning of environmental information.
Thus, this singular finding should be further explored. Further-
more, while one study with angry, fearful, and neutral expressions
only found increased activation of amygdala and other regions
to fearful faces (Blair et al., 2008b), another one found increased
amygdala and ACC activation to angry and fearful faces (Blair et al.,
2011). In a one-back task on face identity, which also ensured atten-
tion allocation to face stimuli, Gentili et al. (2008) found a partially
contradicting pattern of higher activation in SAD to angry, fear-
ful, disgusted, happy, and neutral faces (compared to those faces
scrambled) in the amygdala, insula, and STS, but reduced acti-
vation in the left FG and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC),
demonstrating mandatory enhanced processing of emotional con-
tent at least in regions associated with emotional evaluation and
self-relevance, while the conditions for reduced activation in FG
and DLPFC have to be further explored.
To sum up, results from these few implicit tasks are quite
heterogeneous concerning the emotion specificity and associated
activated brain regions. This could indicate that the effects are not
threat-related, but rather an amplified response to faces in general.
Nevertheless, due to the tasks applied, the observed effects can be
regarded at least as unintentional and probably efficient. However,
as the task of gender or identity processing might have been quite
easy, the extent of efficient emotion processing cannot be suffi-
ciently determined. Moreover, whether implicit processing is also
unconscious or uncontrollable has not been tested so far in fMRI
studies.
Task effects. The direct comparison of explicit vs. implicit tasks
in the same study offers the opportunity to investigate automatic-
ity directly and thus address relative automaticity within the same
participants, under the same experimental conditions, and with
the same stimuli. Astonishingly though, to our knowledge there is
only one fMRI study which experimentally varied attention allo-
cation while individuals with SAD were presented with angry and
neutral facial expressions (Straube et al., 2004). Individuals with
SAD and healthy control participants had to attend either to the
facial expression (explicit) or to the picture type (photorealistic
vs. schematic) irrespective of the facial expression (implicit task).
In the absence of behavioral performance differences between the
groups, fMRI data for photographic faces yielded the following
findings: in the explicit task, angry vs. neutral faces led to higher
activation in all regions in both groups, but stronger effects in
SAD compared to controls were only found in the insula. In the
implicit task, individuals with SAD showed greater responses to
angry vs. neutral faces in the amygdala, insula, FG, STS, and
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parahippocampal gyrus compared to controls. The comparison
of the tasks revealed that while controls generally (in all ROIs)
showed stronger activation (i.e., for the contrast angry vs. neutral)
in the explicit compared to the implicit task, SAD participants
exhibited similar activation under both tasks, suggesting that angry
facial expressions were processed automatically – also in extrastri-
ate visual areas – even when this was not required, while healthy
participants showed no such mandatory threat-processing. This
supports the notion of initial hypervigilance in SAD, with auto-
matic hyperresponsivity under the implicit task only. However,
it should be noted that the implicit task once again only offers
the opportunity to determine the level of unintentional process-
ing and allows some assumptions on efficient processing, while
consciousness and control have not been examined.
So far, fMRI studies with explicit, implicit, and free view-
ing paradigms yielded mixed results concerning the processing
of threat-related faces in SAD in regions as the amygdala and
insula, but also ACC, FG, STS, and prefrontal regions. The ques-
tion remains whether enhanced processing is actually driven by
the threat-relevance of the stimuli, or rather by faces as social
stimuli per se. Interestingly, in the only study that modulated the
level of processing within the study (Straube et al., 2004), overall
differential processing between the groups only emerged in the
implicit condition, suggesting that healthy participants can better
stick to task demands, while patients with SAD exhibit mandatory
threat-processing even under distraction.
EEG studies
Explicit tasks. Due to low temporal resolution of fMRI studies, a
separation between initial hypersensitivity and subsequent control
or avoidance is hard to draw, especially as many studies did not
report prefrontal activation. Therefore, ERP studies may be better
capable of distinguishing between earlier and later processes and
the extent to which these are differentially modulated by emo-
tional content as a function of task-relevance. For ERPs, results
from studies with explicit emotion classification yield mixed results.
One study (Kolassa et al., 2009) showed enhanced P1 amplitudes
in response to all (angry, sad, happy, and neutral) schematic faces.
This is well in line with the idea that the P1 is modulated by selec-
tive attention (Hillyard and Münte, 1984) and could thus indicate
a general early attentional bias toward incoming stimuli in SAD.
Another study found no differences (Van Peer et al., 2009), while a
third study demonstrated larger amplitudes of later P3/late posi-
tive potential (LPP) in high socially anxious participants to angry
and disgusted faces (Moser et al., 2008). The latter was interpreted
as a late negative face bias in high socially anxious individuals that
was in contrast to an early positivity bias in low socially anxious
participants.
Sewell et al. (2008) used an emotional oddball task that requires
attending emotion more or less explicitly. Within this task, partic-
ipants were presented with frequent neutral opposed to rare angry
and happy faces. In half of the blocks, participants were requested
to respond to angry and to ignore happy faces, and vice versa
for the other blocks. The authors report a correlation of P3 ampli-
tude to angry but not happy ignored faces with the level of anxiety.
Another emotional oddball study (Rossignol et al., 2012a) demon-
strated enhanced P1 amplitudes for deviant (i.e., emotional) faces
in participants with high (at least “marked social phobia”) social
anxiety scores and a correlation between the level of anxiety and
P1 amplitude, while N170 and P3b were not influenced by group.
This again argues for an early attentional bias in SAD as indexed
by P1. Although the participants were not informed that deviants
were determined by emotionality, emotion can be regarded as
task-relevant.
Free viewing paradigms. A free viewing ERP study (Mühlberger
et al., 2009) demonstrated no group effects in the N170, but
enhanced EPN to fearful and angry faces associated with social
anxiety, while an emotional modulation of the LPP observed in
low anxious participants was not found in high anxious individ-
uals. By means of steady state visual evoked potentials (ssVEP), a
measure of sustained visual activation to certain stimulus types,
enhanced early visual processing of angry, fearful, and happy faces
was shown (McTeague et al., 2011). These results further show an
early perceptual bias toward emotional facial expressions under
non-restricted experimental conditions.
Implicit tasks. ERP studies that investigated implicit processing
by means of dot-probe (Helfinstein et al., 2008; Mueller et al.,
2009) and spatial cuing (Rossignol et al., 2012b) consistently found
enhanced P1 amplitudes to at least angry faces. The two studies
that tested high and low socially anxious participants instead of
patients diagnosed with SAD (Helfinstein et al., 2008; Rossignol
et al., 2012b) additionally found enhanced P2 amplitudes, while
no such effect was reported for SAD (Mueller et al., 2009), a
finding that should be further substantiated. Results from these
implicit tasks once again indicate an early attentional bias in SAD
as indexed by enhanced P1, which does not necessarily seem to
be related to the threat content. Two ssVEP change detection tasks
found enhanced cortical facilitation over visual areas (Wieser et al.,
2011) and enhanced frequency amplitudes (Wieser et al., 2012) for
task-irrelevant angry faces in individuals with higher social anx-
iety, demonstrating that this measure also provides insights into
preferential visual processing of angry faces in anxious partici-
pants. Moreover, the difference between the reviewed explicit and
implicit fMRI tasks seems smaller than the one between explicit
and implicit EEG tasks, as the attentional bias tasks foster a much
more indirect emotion processing with shorter presentation dura-
tions. This might explain the absence of later effects, but might
yield an even better approach to automatic processing. With very
brief presentation durations or masking, these paradigms would
allow the investigation of unconscious processing.
Task effects. So far, there are only two ERP studies in SAD that
directly compared task effects. While one study did not find dif-
ferential effects of the task (Kolassa et al., 2007), another study
with photorealistic pictures (Kolassa and Miltner, 2006) which
had to be categorized either according to emotion or gender indi-
cated larger right-hemispheric N170 amplitudes in response to
angry faces on the emotion identification task in SAD. In con-
trast to the abovementioned studies, there were no differences
between patients and healthy controls in P1 and P2 amplitudes
to angry faces. The finding on N170 might indicate abnormalities
in early visual threat-processing in SAD. The fact that differential
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processing occurred in the explicit but not in the implicit task is
in contrast to the described fMRI study (Straube et al., 2004).
To conclude, the processing of threat-related facial expres-
sions in SAD seems to be characterized by automatic activation
of brain regions associated with initial emotion processing and
perception, as well as by enhanced early components associated
with attention allocation (see Table 1). However, with both mea-
sures (fMRI, EEG), results are rather inconsistent, especially with
regards to threat-specificity. The effects occur at least uninten-
tionally, probably even efficiently. As it occurs under conditions in
which control of the process is possibly prohibited by the task, it
might also be uncontrollable in SAD as compared to healthy con-
trols. Concerning the low number of studies that experimentally
varied the automaticity of threat processing in SAD with respect
to dimensions of automaticity as consciousness and control, but
also efficiency, further research is needed to explore differential
activation of the amygdala, insula, visual, and prefrontal areas, as
well as early and late ERPs.
PROCESSING OF VOICE STIMULI
The neural network underlying the processing of emotional
prosody comprises cortical and subcortical areas (Schirmer and
Kotz, 2006; Wildgruber et al., 2009; Brück et al., 2011; Witte-
man et al., 2012). While the superior temporal regions serve
as the cortical input region involved in fast analysis of acoustic
features (Rauschecker and Tian, 2000; King and Nelken, 2009),
frontal regions are associated with emotional evaluation processes
(Ethofer et al., 2009; Leitman et al., 2010). The role of the amygdala
might be associated with rapid detection and responding to rel-
evant prosodic features (Sander and Scheich, 2001; Bach et al.,
2008b) rather than recognition of specific emotional prosody
(Scott et al., 1997). As proposed for the visual modality (Ama-
ral et al., 2003), the amygdala may increase the activation of
the STS due to back-projections to sensory areas (Yukie, 2002;
Sander et al., 2005). Neuroimaging studies in healthy participants
detected activation of the OFC when attention was directed to
the emotional information of voices, but not when attention was
either directed to other information of the voice or to another
spatial location (Sander et al., 2005; Quadflieg et al., 2008). In
contrast, the auditory cortex and several subcortical areas showed
higher activation to emotional vs. neutral voices irrespective of
attention allocation to specific features of the voice (Wildgruber
et al., 2005; Ethofer et al., 2006; Bach et al., 2008a; Quadflieg et al.,
2008) or specific spatial locations (Sander et al., 2005). However,
when attention is directed to the visual modality while hearing
emotional voices, higher activation of the amygdala and audi-
tory cortices disappears (Mothes-Lasch et al., 2011). Similarly, a
demanding visual task simultaneous to hearing emotional voices
diminishes higher activation of the auditory cortex (Mothes-Lasch
et al., 2012).
Neural processing of prosodic cues in SAD has as yet only been
investigated by one study (Quadflieg et al., 2008; see Table 1).
This study explored brain activity when emotional information vs.
gender information of a voice was categorized. Thus, emotional
information was either task-relevant or -irrelevant. The results
showed higher activation to emotional vs. neutral voices in the
auditory cortex, insula, amygdala, and other subcortical regions
regardless of the task and irrespective of whether participants
were anxious or non-anxious. In line with other findings (Wild-
gruber et al., 2005; Ethofer et al., 2009), the left OFC showed
only increased activation to emotional vs. neutral voices when
the emotional content had to be attended. However, in anxious
participants, higher activation of the right OFC to emotional vs.
neutral voices was found in both tasks. Thus, the OFC seems to
show an increased activation to threatening voices that is related
to the disorder. Interestingly, in line with investigations of facial
expressions (Stein et al., 2002; Straube et al., 2004, 2005), differen-
tial brain activation occurred in the absence of behavioral effects
in anxious and non-anxious participants. In contrast to investiga-
tions using angry facial expressions, the study of Quadflieg et al.
(2008) failed to reveal any activation differences between groups
in the insula or the amygdala. Thus, the processing of threatening
voices does not seem to be comparable to the processing of faces
and might not rely on hypersensitivity of the amygdala. Neverthe-
less, the results once again argue for automatic brain responses,
leading to different results in patients than in healthy controls.
However, these conclusions have to be considered as preliminary
and more studies are needed with increased sample size and a
wider range of used auditory stimuli.
PROCESSING OF WORD STIMULI
As yet, the processing of word stimuli in SAD has been widely dis-
regarded. However, these stimuli could help to answer the question
whether enhanced neural activity in the amygdala to faces is merely
due to their evolutionary relevance as proposed by Öhman and
Mineka (2001), or whether similar responses also occur for words,
as these are highly learned stimuli (stimulus-meaning association)
used in social interactions, although they do not implicate threat
on their own. Disorder-related words are associated with atten-
tional biases (Amir et al., 2003; Musa et al., 2003; Vassilopoulos,
2005) and rated as being more unpleasant and arousing by indi-
viduals with SAD as compared to healthy participants (Schmidt
et al., 2010).
Processing of negative vs. neutral words elicits increased amyg-
dala activation (Isenberg et al., 1999; Hamann and Mao, 2002;
Maddock et al., 2003) in healthy participants. A recent study
(Straube et al., 2011c) reported emotional words to generally
elicit increased amygdala activation and that negative compared to
positive words elicited higher insula activation. Moreover, direct
compared to indirect processing led to enhanced activation for
emotional compared to neutral words in dorsomedial PFC and
ACC, therefore demonstrating some kind of task-dependence in
the activation of these areas.
There are only two studies using word stimuli to investigate
neural correlates of SAD. One study presented short statements of
praise or criticism either referring to the self or to another per-
son (Blair et al., 2008a) and found enhanced activation to negative
statements in medial PFC and amygdala in SAD, but only when the
statements were self-referential. The other one is, to our knowl-
edge, the only study which has explored the neural correlates of the
processing of threat-related words in SAD (Schmidt et al., 2010)
under different task demands (see Table 1). In this fMRI study,
patients with SAD and healthy controls had to categorize anxiety-
related and neutral words either with respect to their reference to
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social interaction situations (explicit task) or to their grammatical
type (implicit task). In the implicit task, patients showed increased
activation in the left amygdala and in right OFC, suggesting a par-
ticular role of these areas in the processing of threat-related words
when these are not task-relevant. There were no group differences
on the explicit task. Nevertheless, symptom severity in patients
was significantly correlated with activation in the insula. As the
insula is assumed to be associated with monitoring of own emo-
tional states (Straube and Miltner, 2011), this seems to be more
expressed when the emotional content is explicitly processed. This
finding is well in line with a similar experiment applying facial
stimuli (Straube et al., 2004). The finding that group differences
emerged especially on the implicit task indicates high vigilance in
socially anxious individuals to these stimuli, although they are not
as evolutionary relevant as faces.
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We reviewed neuroimaging and electrophysiological studies with
respect to the existence and extent of automatic processing of emo-
tional faces and other threat-related social stimuli in SAD (for an
overview, see Table 1). While many studies were not designed to
address automatic threat processing in SAD explicitly, they never-
theless could demonstrate automatic processing, as far as studies
used implicit tasks with respect to the threat-relevance of stim-
uli. However, these studies provide quite heterogeneous results.
Increased activation of the amygdala, insula, and other regions
has been shown to all faces regardless of emotion (Gentili et al.,
2008) in combination with altered temporal response pattern to
emotional faces (Campbell et al., 2007), or to various types of
negative facial expressions (Stein, 2002; Blair et al., 2008b, 2011).
An fMRI study that directly investigated automatic processes in
SAD showed that the higher activation of the amygdala, insula,
and other regions to angry vs. neutral faces in SAD persists under
implicit task conditions (Straube et al., 2004). Similarly, electro-
physiological studies revealed early ERP differences between SAD
and healthy controls in P1 either to all facial expressions (Rossig-
nol et al., 2012b) or to negative facial expressions (Helfinstein
et al., 2008; Mueller et al., 2009), as well as enhanced ssVEPs to
negative facial expressions (Wieser et al., 2011, 2012). ERP studies
that have directly investigated automatic processes have yielded
mixed results, with either heightened P1 to all facial expressions
for SAD vs. healthy controls regardless of the task (Kolassa et al.,
2007) or only differential effects for SAD under the explicit task
(Kolassa and Miltner, 2006). Furthermore, fMRI studies inves-
tigating threat-related stimuli beyond faces revealed increased
amygdala activation to social threat words (Schmidt et al., 2010),
as well as increased OFC activation to angry vs. neutral prosody
and social threat vs. neutral words (Quadflieg et al., 2008; Schmidt
et al., 2010). In the following, several aspects of these findings and
remaining questions are discussed in relation to brain activation,
experimental tasks, stimuli modality, emotional content of stimuli,
specificity in SAD, and neuroscientific methods.
NEUROANATOMY OF AUTOMATIC THREAT PROCESSING IN SAD
Despite several remaining questions, the reviewed data support
models suggesting a role of the amygdala for automatic threat
processing in SAD. The role of the amygdala might be to poten-
tiate vigilance to relevant stimuli and to process the emotional
valence of stimuli (Pessoa and Adolphs, 2010; Lipka et al., 2011;
Straube et al., 2011b). It should be noted that different subre-
gions of the amygdala have been proposed to subserve differ-
ent functions. Attentional functions have been ascribed to the
central nucleus within the dorsal amygdala, while responses to
stimulus valence seem to mainly activate the ventral amygdala
that covers the basolateral parts of the amygdala, which have
been shown to be more strongly involved in stimulus process-
ing than in the organization of behavioral responses (Kim et al.,
2004; Hoffman et al., 2007; Boll et al., 2011). This dissociation
of dorsal and ventral parts within the amygdala is also in line
with a recent meta-analysis by Mende-Siedlecki et al. (2013),
in which the authors found differences in the response of neu-
ronal populations in ventral and dorsal parts of the amygdala
for valence (ventral amygdala) and salience (dorsal amygdala)
of a facial expression. Future studies should use high-resolution
fMRI to investigate the role and task-dependence of activa-
tion of specific subregions of the amygdala in SAD. Further-
more, several fMRI and EEG studies found increased activa-
tion in visual areas in response to angry faces in SAD (Straube
et al., 2005; Wieser et al., 2011, 2012), especially under implicit
conditions (Straube et al., 2004). This supports the hypothe-
sis of increased sensory processing of disorder-related threat.
Since the amygdala modulates selective perceptual processing via
back-projections to sensory cortices (Vuilleumier et al., 2002;
Amaral et al., 2003; Freese and Amaral, 2005), the activation
in sensory areas might at least be partially boosted by the
amygdala.
Besides the amygdala, several other areas seem to be involved in
threat processing in SAD. Medial and lateral prefrontal areas and
ACC have been suggested to be involved in cognitive-emotional
interactions (Straube and Miltner, 2011). In general, these areas
seem to be relevant for higher cognitive appraisal processes, for the
control and regulation of behavioral emotional responses, and par-
tially also for the generation of autonomic emotional responses.
Especially ventral parts of the PFC and OFC have been implicated
in the control of emotional responses (Ochsner and Gross, 2005).
These areas seem to be involved in controlled and explicit threat
processing. Self-referential attention in SAD might also be an auto-
matic response (Clark and Wells, 1995) and might be associated
with MPFC (Blair et al., 2008a).
Several studies found OFC activation to threat in SAD, even
during implicit tasks (Quadflieg et al., 2008; Schmidt et al., 2010;
see Table 1). The OFC has previously been proposed to evalu-
ate sensory signals to enable appropriate affective and behavioral
responses (Damasio et al., 1994; Rolls, 2000). More specifically,
its role in the representation of rewards and punishments guiding
learning and behavioral adjustments has repeatedly been pointed
out (Damasio et al., 1994; Rolls et al., 1994; Rolls, 2000). A
lack of orbitofrontal modulation due to brain damage results in
severely disturbed social behavior and inappropriate impulsive-
ness (Damasio et al., 1994; Rolls et al., 1994; Hornak et al., 2003).
Thus, in social anxiety, the functional role of orbitofrontal activa-
tion might be to support avoidance behavior or to inhibit actual
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behavior in the case of perceived social threat (Veit et al., 2002;
Quadflieg et al., 2008; Schmidt et al., 2010).
Furthermore, several studies found activation of the insula to
social stimuli, even during implicit tasks (Straube et al., 2004;
Campbell et al., 2007; Gentili et al., 2008; see Table 1). This brain
region is strongly involved in interoception and representation of
bodily states and might support aversive feelings by the perception
of bodily states of arousal (Straube et al., 2004). However, findings
are inconsistent and the role of task conditions is unclear. Even
if insula responses can be detected during implicit tasks (Straube
et al., 2004), activation in this area increases with increasing atten-
tion to own emotions (Straube and Miltner, 2011) and is more
strongly associated with symptom severity of SAD during explicit
emotion tasks (Schmidt et al., 2010).
Taken together, there might be different processing stages asso-
ciated with different activation profiles and different cognitive-
emotional processes, e.g., avoidance and regulatory strategies and
inhibition of the amygdala following initial hypervigilance to
threat (Hofmann et al., 2012). Future studies should investigate
the time course and role of different areas for automatic and
non-automatic processes in more detail.
ROLE OF TASK CONDITIONS
There are only a few systematic attempts to investigate automatic
neural processes in SAD by means of task modulation (see Table 1),
which allows separating different information processing modes
(Straube and Miltner, 2011). While implicit processing modes
are related to rather automatic responses to emotional stimuli,
explicit processing requires that participant’s attention is directed
to the emotional significance of stimuli or to one’s own emotional
involvement, i.e., to own feelings (LeDoux, 1996; Damasio, 1999).
As described, these different levels of information processing seem
to depend partially on different neural systems (LeDoux, 1996;
Damasio, 1999; Phan et al., 2002). To elucidate the specific role of
a brain region as a function of the information processing mode,
it is necessary to systematically vary the level of evaluation of emo-
tional stimuli and to control for other factors (see also Lieberman
et al., 2007). For example, in line with a recent study (Straube
and Miltner, 2011), future studies could systematically manipu-
late participants’ attention to stimuli and emotional relevance of
stimuli.
Furthermore, the extent of automatic processing in terms of
efficiency could be investigated by varying demands of a main task
while threat-related stimuli are presented and thus serve as dis-
tractors. As proposed by Lavie (1995, 2005), attentional resources
available for the processing of distractors should decline with
increasing perceptual demands. Thus, distracting stimuli should
not be processed under high attentional load. In line with this pre-
diction, higher activation of the amygdala and partly of sensory
cortices to threat-related faces diminished under high attentional
load in healthy participants (Pessoa et al., 2002; Bishop et al., 2007;
Silvert et al., 2007). However, for example spider phobics did not
show reduced activation of the amygdala and sensory cortices to
disorder-related stimuli even under high attentional load (Straube
et al., 2011a). These results suggest efficient processing of threat-
related stimuli in anxious individuals. Similar studies should be
conducted in SAD.
The impact of awareness could be examined by studies using
backward masking (but see for methodological problems Pessoa
et al., 2005a, 2006; Straube et al., 2010) or binocular rivalry (Pasley
et al., 2004; Williams et al., 2004a). For specific phobia, a link
between vigilance to threat and amygdala responses to subliminal
threat has been proposed (Lipka et al., 2011). Whether this holds
also true for SAD remains to be elucidated.
Only some studies investigated neural correlates of attentional
biases (Kolassa et al., 2007; Helfinstein et al., 2008; Mueller et al.,
2009; Rossignol et al., 2012a) and found generally enhanced
P1 amplitudes in SAD irrespective of the existence of behav-
ioral effects. Therefore, the relation should be further substan-
tiated by correlations or regressions between the behavioral data
and neural activation. So far, ERPs have only been investigated
from P1 onward. However, very recent MEG results (Steinberg
et al., 2012) indicate even earlier automatic differential pro-
cessing of emotional stimuli in frontal and occipito-temporal
regions (50–80 ms). These rapid effects should also be investigated
to test the hypothesis of rapid, non-intended threat-processing
in SAD.
Finally, processes beyond initial hypervigilance to threat might
also be triggered automatically. These include avoidance of exter-
nal threat or increased self-focused attention. It is likely that these
processes are at least partially automatic, probably as a highly
learned reaction in response to threat stimuli in SAD. Designs
that vary cognitive resources or intentional focus might investigate
automaticity of these processes.
FACES AND MORE
Due to the large number of studies focusing on emotional face pro-
cessing in SAD, the question arises whether automatic processes
are specific for faces. Emotional prosody can also be regarded
as a disorder-relevant stimulus, which provides direct hints of
approval or disapproval in SAD. In contrast to findings for
faces, the study of Quadflieg et al. (2008) failed to reveal differ-
ences in emotional voice processing in the amygdala (but found
automatic activation of the OFC). Whether these results indi-
cate dissimilarities of processing of threat-related stimuli in the
visual and auditory modality, or whether the task was not able
to reveal differences, needs to be further explored. Implicit pro-
cessing of threat-related words in SAD (Schmidt et al., 2010)
demonstrated enhanced activation of the amygdala and OFC, sug-
gesting that these stimuli, although not evolutionary relevant,
are processed as automatically as faces. Thus, automatic brain
processes do not seem to be specific for faces. The dominance
of a certain modality in SAD could best be investigated by com-
bined experimental designs that use faces, words, and voices as
stimuli. Furthermore, the comparison of emotional stimuli pre-
sented in different modalities could reveal insights in precondi-
tions for the activation of supramodal emotion representations.
There might also be differences between sensory modalities in
the sensitivity to specific emotions. Finally, social interactions
obviously do not exclusively rely on faces, voices, and words.
Gestures are also powerful signals eliciting similar emotional
responses as faces (Magnée et al., 2007; De Gelder, 2009) and
neural responses to such cues in SAD might be investigated in
future studies.
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SPECIFICITY OF THREAT-RELATED STIMULI
Whether certain emotions in SAD are more relevant than oth-
ers is a matter of debate. Remarkably, different studies compared
different sets of emotional expressions and reported inconsistent
effects for negative, positive, and neutral stimuli (see Table 1).
While some studies on SAD showed abnormal processes with
regard to angry faces, healthy participants show predominantly
higher activation of the amygdala and FG to fearful faces (Whalen
et al., 2001). Additionally, most studies on trait and/or state anxi-
ety reveal sensitivity and automatic activation of the amygdala to
fearful faces (Etkin et al., 2004; Bishop et al., 2007). While both
fearful and angry faces provide information of threat, the source
information concerning the threat differs between these stimuli
(Whalen, 1998). Confronted with an angry face, the source of the
threat is the person showing that expression, and the addressee
the person perceiving that face (in the case of direct gaze). In con-
trast, fearful faces only provide information about the presence
of threat without the information of its source, thus providing a
more ambiguous or diffuse signal of threat. Amygdala responses
might be modulated by the relevance of the stimuli for the specific
disorder, e.g., stimuli of rejection for SAD and stimuli of ambigu-
ity for anxiety in general. However, results show higher activation
to angry but not to fearful faces (Stein et al., 2002), which is par-
tially in contrast with another study (Blair et al., 2011) that found
increased activation to both angry and fearful faces in SAD, and
an earlier study (Blair et al., 2008b) that only found increased
activation to fearful faces.
Furthermore, some studies have even reported enhanced acti-
vation to happy faces in SAD (Straube et al., 2005). This might
be due to the use of a free viewing paradigm. Probably, under
restricted conditions, only the processing of threat-related stim-
uli is boosted. Higher amygdala activation even to neutral faces
(Birbaumer et al., 1998) might be explained by a negative interpre-
tation bias in SAD for ambiguous signals of threat. Another expla-
nation might be that SAD is characterized by generally modified
face processing without a specific focus on threat-relevance. Thus,
it remains to be answered whether effects in SAD are disorder-
related, corresponding to specific emotions, or whether they are
driven by general factors such as ambiguity, valence, or just arousal
or intensity. The latter is in line with the finding of higher amygdala
activation to high vs. low intensity expressions only in SAD (Yoon
et al., 2007). Methodologically, it is difficult to distinguish between
valence and arousal, since threat-related faces are more arousing
than happy faces (see also Straube et al., 2005). Future studies
should carefully compare a broad range of emotional expressions
and simultaneously control for valence, arousal, and intensity.
In this paragraph, we discussed threat-specificity in face pro-
cessing. Nevertheless, the considerations apply also to prosody and
word stimuli with respect to the role of different emotions as well
as the role of valence, arousal, and intensity. Needless to say, there
is also a bulk of other aversive stimuli such as odors that could be
investigated.
DISORDER SPECIFICITY
Future studies should aim to investigate whether neural automatic
processing of threat-related social stimuli found in SAD is spe-
cific to this disorder, or whether there are common mechanisms
in other anxiety disorders or psychopathologies. The processing of
threat-related stimuli in different anxiety disorders might differ in
the extent of automatic processing. For example, Phan et al. (2006)
show a correlation of the activation of the amygdala to negative
faces with severity of social anxiety symptoms but not with state or
trait anxiety, and Rossignol et al. (2012b) show that heightened P2
and P3 to angry faces is associated with social anxiety but not with
trait anxiety, indicating differences in early automatic processing.
Other studies suggest a dissociation between SAD and general-
ized anxiety disorder (Blair et al., 2008b). While patients with
SAD showed increased amygdala activation to fearful faces related
to their reported level of anxiety, patients with generalized anxi-
ety disorder had decreased activation to these faces, but increased
activation to angry faces in a lateral region of the middle frontal
gyrus, which was in turn related to their level of reported anxiety.
A meta-analysis on SAD, specific phobia, and post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD; Etkin and Wager, 2007) showed hyperactivation
of the amygdala and insula more frequently in SAD and specific
phobia than in PTSD, while the latter showed reduced activation in
dorsal and rostral ACC and ventromedial prefrontal cortex during
negative emotional processing. Even on the behavioral level, it has
been suggested that anxiety disorders are associated with uncon-
trollable, unintentional, and unconscious processing of negative
information, whereas major depressive disorder is associated with
only uncontrollable processing (Teachman et al., 2012), demon-
strating the need for carefully distinguishing between different
aspects of automaticity. In each case, correlations between mea-
sures of automatic processes and symptom severity would improve
interpretations concerning the disorder specificity of the observed
effects.
CHANGING AUTOMATIC RESPONSES TO THREAT
Some training studies in the style of dot-probe tasks have focused
on attention allocation to positive stimuli in anxiety. They found
positive post-training effects on self-reported anxiety (Schmidt
et al., 2009), behavioral and physiological (skin conductance) mea-
sures (Heeren et al., 2012), as well as response times and ERP
amplitudes (Eldar and Bar-Haim, 2010). The effects of these stud-
ies may rely on stronger control of distracting stimuli. However,
the neural basis of these therapy effects is unclear. One could
assume changes in amygdala reactivity or PFC involvement. There-
fore, it would be interesting to apply the abovementioned tasks
in therapy-evaluation studies with respect to the changeability of
automatic brain responses and the relationship between them and
therapy outcome. The initial extent of automatic brain responses
might serve as a predictor for therapy outcome (Doehrmann et al.,
2013), and the individual changeability of automatic processes
might probably serve as a predictor for longtime effects of therapy.
CONCLUSION
We reviewed the current evidence for automatic neural process-
ing of threat-related stimuli in SAD by means of neuroimaging
and electrophysiological studies to shed more light on the spatial
and temporal basis of these processes. We incorporated stud-
ies with different stimuli, modalities, and experimental designs,
and reported evidence for automatic activation of the amygdala,
insula, and sensory cortices as well as in early electrophysiological
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components under different tasks and experimental conditions
(see Table 1). As systematic studies, especially on the nature and
extent of automatic processing, are still widely lacking, we sug-
gested experimental designs aimed at providing a more compre-
hensive view of this disorder. These should: (1) use different stim-
ulus modalities to explore face specificity, (2) examine different
emotional expressions, (3) compare different forms of anxiety, (4)
use more sophisticated experimental designs to investigate features
of automaticity systematically (including direct associations with
attentional biases), and (5) combine neuroscientific methods
(such as functional neuroimaging and electrophysiology). These
approaches might further increase the understanding of SADs and
might also give useful hints for therapeutic approaches. Studies
might test whether automatic brain responses are affected by suc-
cessful psychotherapy or whether such responses predict therapy
success in the short or long term.
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